Abstract. We introduce two improvements to the recently proposed so called magic ink DSS signatures. A first improvement is that we reduce the overhead for tracing without noticeably increasing any other cost. The tracing cost is linear in the number of generated signatures in the original proposal; our improved version reduces this to a logarithmic cost in the common case. A second improvement is that we introduce a method for determining whether forged currency is in circulation, without affecting the privacy of honest users. Our improvements rely on our introducing a so called hint value. This is an encryption of the signature transcript received, submitted by the signature receiver. Part of the processing of this hint value is done using a new technique in which the high costs of secret sharing and robust computation on shared data are avoided by manipulation of encrypted data rather than plaintext. (Whereas the idea of computing on encrypted data is not a new notion in itself, it has to the best of our knowledge not previously been employed to limit the use of costly secret sharing based protocols.)
Introduction
Many changes in society are caused by the introduction of vital technology. An example of this is the invention of the printing press in 1457, which by a significant reduction in the costs of printed material caused a drastically increased literacy, and political awareness by allowing inexpensive information dissemination to the masses. Another example of an important step forward is the telephone, invented in 1876. These and innumerable other inventions caused and fueled the industrial revolution, transforming society in an eye-blink of human history. Although hardly anticipated only a few years ago, the Internet now promises to be a similar catalyst of changes to society. An integral part of this new revolution we are facing relates to commerce.
This new technology, however, promises to be as dangerous as it is useful. On the one hand, we know that given the strikingly low costs of information collection and analysis of the same, payment schemes not offering sufficient privacy may indeed act as an ever-present secret police in the hands of dubious commercial interests. On the other hand, it is also well-known that too much privacy may present a threat to society at large, in the form of terrorism, blackmailing, and the undermining of entire economies by corruption of or dissemination of the secret keys of banks (see [33, 21] ). A recent trend in research in the area of electronic commerce has therefore been to find payment schemes with revokable anonymity (e.g., [5, 6, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 34, 35, 36] ,) allowing a set of trustees to remove the privacy of a given user or payment, but not allowing an attacker to correlate payments to the identities of the payers without corrupting a substantial number of these trustees.
Most signature schemes with revokable anonymity offer two types of tracing, namely: (1) from a given signing session or identity of a receiver to a description of the signature(s) obtained, and the opposite direction: (2) from a given signature to the corresponding signing session or identity of the signature receiver. Magic ink signatures [23] offer a third tracing option, which is to determine if a given signature was obtained in a given session or not. This third type allows a tighter control over tracing by allowing suspicions to be verified, without divulging any more information than whether the signature and the session match or not.
In the magic ink proposal in [23] , the first and third tracing options have costs that are independent of the number of signatures that have been generated. The second tracing option, however, has an expected cost which is linear in the number of generated signatures. This is a concern in a practical implementation, especially given that this type of tracing is likely to be the most commonly needed.
A first result of this paper is to present a modification of the original magic ink scheme that lowers the cost of this second tracing option to a logarithmic cost 1 in the common case, with a fall-back to a linear cost in a highly unlikely case. This is done without affecting the other tracing costs, and with only a minor increase in storage costs for the signature generating servers.
A second issue we deal with relates to increasing the protection against attacks. One of the main benefits of magic ink signatures compared to other schemes with revokable anonymity is that it allows the signer/bank to distinguish between valid signatures that were produced by the bank servers, and valid signatures that were produced by another party holding the signing keys. This is important if there is a suspicion that the signing keys of the banks have been corrupted (corresponding to the so-called bank robbery attack). Whereas the availability of this method promises to act as a definitive deterrent against attacks aiming to corrupt the bank keys, the very high cost of the filtering makes the method impractical unless it is certain that the signing keys have been corrupted.
A second result of our paper is to answer the important question of how it can be detected at a very early stage that a bank key has been compromised. In previous proposals that are granting privacy to honest users, no such method was available. The crux of the idea is to detect valid bank signatures that have not been produced by the bank without affecting our stringent requirements on the privacy of honest users. This is similar in spirit to the notion of failstop signatures [31] , which were proposed by Pfitzmann to allow the detection of valid but forged signatures. We propose a method for detecting forged DSA signatures, using the very same constructions introduced to lower the cost of tracing. This allows the above mentioned expensive filtering techniques to be employed only when necessary.
As a result, we obtain a highly efficient and practical signature generation scheme offering the following four important mechanisms: (1) tracing from a given signing session to the corresponding signature (or coin); (2) tracing from a given signature/coin to the corresponding signing session; (3) comparison of sessions and signatures to determine whether such a pair correspond to each other; and (4) detection of signing keys having been compromised. This last feature allows instantaneous installation of new secret and public keys, and an on-line filtering of all deposited coins of the old type to remove forged coins.
Thus, this new scheme, which offers improvements both in terms of efficiency and functionality, would potentially allow a realistic payment scheme that succeeds in balancing the scales of privacy in a way that avoids all known attacks and weaknesses.
Outline
Section 2 presents our general model. In section 3, we define the properties our scheme achieves. In section 4 we explain the tools we utilize to achieve our solution, which is discussed in section 5. This is followed in section 6 by the introduction of the main protocol for improved magic ink signatures and all sub-protocols that are needed. Section 7 presents the second result of our paper, namely a protocol for detecting illicit signatures. In section 8 we enumerate the properties of our scheme; these are proven in the Appendix.
Model
We assume that there are three types of (polynomial-time) participants: signers/tracers S, receivers R, and verifiers. A signer/tracer is an entity with two functionalities (as indicated by the name). When acting like a signer, this entity produces signatures on messages provided by the receiver; when acting like a tracer, it selectively correlates signatures and sessions that match (this will be elaborated on later.) The receiver sends message-signature pairs to a verifier, who wants to verify their validity with respect to the public key of the signer.
(Typically, these three entities correspond to banks, payers, and merchants; or, alternatively, to certification agencies, service providers, and users who want to determine whether a given service provider is certified.)
We consider two types of adversaries. The first, the so-called mobile adversary (introduced in [29] ), may control up to a threshold of signers/tracers, and any number of receivers and verifiers. He can adaptively corrupt different signer/tracers for each time period, whose length is a security parameter set by the protocol designers. Our second type of adversary is an adversary of the first type who also has complete read access to the private storage areas of all signer/tracer servers. We call this adversary, which was introduced in [23] , the read-all adversary.
Definitions
Terminology: We say that the predicate match(s i , τ i ) is true if and only if s i is the transcript the receiver obtains in the signing session i, and τ i is the transcript obtained by the signer during the same session i.
Definition 1: Anonymity and Revokable Anonymity
Let R be a set of honest signature receivers and S is a set of honest signature servers. Additionally, let R be a set of dishonest signature receivers, and S a set of dishonest signature servers. We let the receivers in R ∪ R interact in the proposed protocols with quorums (i.e., sets of sufficient size to recostruct the related secret) from S ∪ S a polynomial number of times n, after which a receiver R i ∈ R obtains a signature s i on a message m i of his choice. We assume that S obtains the set of all generated signatures {s i }, and a list of all signer-side transcripts (τ 1 , . . ., τ n ). We say our protocols implement anonymity if it is not possible for R ∪ S to match any signature s i , obtained by a receiver in R, to its corresponding signer-side transcript τ i with probability better than what is achieved by making a guess uniformly at random from all transcripts produced during sessions with R. We say our protocols implement revokable anonymity if any quorum of honest servers S or tracing servers can perform the following three transactions in polynomial time:
1. Given a valid message-signature pair described by s i and the list of all signerside transcripts (τ 1 , . . ., τ n ), select the value τ j , such that match(s i , τ j ). 2. Given a valid message-signature pair described by s i and one signer-side transcript τ j , determine whether match(s i , τ j ) holds. 3. Given a signer-side transcript τ i , compute a value trace i such that given trace i and a value s j , a third party can determine in polynomial time, and without any interaction, whether match(s j , τ i ) holds.
Definition 2: Unforgeability
As before, we let R be the set of honest signature receivers; R the set of dishonest signature receivers; S the set of honest signature servers; and S the set of dishonest signature servers. We let the receivers in R∪R interact with quorums from S ∪ S a polynomial number of times. Let σ be the set of valid messagesignature pairs obtained by R, and σ the set of valid message-signature pairs obtained by R . We say that a signature 2 is unforgeable if it is infeasible for the adversary to output a valid message-signature pair that is not in σ ∪ σ .
Definition 3: Illicit Signature Detection
We refer to an illicit message-signature pair as any valid message-signature pair s for which there is no signer-side transcript τ such that match(s, τ ). (That is, illicit signatures are valid signatures produced by an adversary who has corrupted the secret signing key used, or has broken the computational assumption of the signature scheme.) We call a system illicit signature detecting if it allows the signer/tracer to distinguish such an illicit message-signature pair from a message-signature pair that is not illicit, but which is produced by the signer.
Building Blocks
Before we introduce the improved version we review some protocols, which will later be used as building blocks.
Notation: Since we use different moduli at different times, we use [op] z to denote the operation op modulo z where this is not clear from the context.
ElGamal:
Our protocol uses ElGamal encryption [16] . To encrypt a value m using the public key y, the person who performs the encryption picks a value γ ∈ u Z q uniformly at random, and computes the pair (a, b) = (my γ , g γ ). Thus, (a, b) is the encryption of m. In order to decrypt this and obtain m, m = a/b x is calculated.
Mix-Networks:
Consider an input list (α 1 , . . ., α n ). A mix-network produces an output which is a random (and secret) permutation of (α 1 x , . . . α n x ), for a given secret key x ∈ Z q . We will use a robust (i.e., such that it produces the correct output given an honest quorum of participants) mix-network [10] decryption scheme, such as [1, 25, 27] .
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS):
We use the DSS [7] (described herein) as the underlying signature algorithm.
Key Generation. A DSS key is composed of public information p, q, g, a public key y and a secret key x, where: 1. p is a prime number of length l where l is a multiple of 64 and 512 ≤ l ≤ 1024. 2. q is a 160-bit prime divisor of p − 1. 3. g is an element of order q in Z * p . 4. x is the secret key of the signer, a random number 1 ≤ x < q.
is the public verification key.
Signature Algorithm. Let m ∈ Z q be a hash of the message to be signed. The signer picks a random number k such that 1 ≤ k < q, calculates k −1 mod q (w.l.o.g. k and k −1 values compared to DSA description are interchanged), and sets
The pair (r, s) is a signature of m.
Verification Algorithm. A signature (r, s) of a message m can be publicly verified by checking that r = [[g
Magic Ink Signatures
As the underlying signature algorithm we use the DSS. For simplicity, we only show a single-server method for producing Magic Ink DSS signatures. Since the privacy depends on the distribution of the signer, the latter must be distributed. The real generation and tracing protocols are therefore distributed variants of this protocol, in order to increase the availability and security of the system and to introduce control (see [23] ).
1. S generates a random secret session key, k ∈ u Z q , and computes r = [g
] p . 2. The signature receiver R has a hashed message m ∈ Z q that he wants signed.
He generates two blinding factors, α, β ∈ u Z q and computes
R sends (µ, ρ) to the signature generating server S. 3. S produces a tag, which will be a function of the signature transcript, and which uniquely identifies this. (We describe this step in more detail later). This tag is used for tracing, in case of anonymity revocation. Then, S generates the DSS signature σ = [k(µ + xρ)] q on the message µ, using the blinded public session key ρ. The server sends σ to R. 4. The signature receiver R unblinds the signature:
The triple (m, r, s) is a valid DSS signature on m.
Tracing: There are three types of tracing we can perform:
1. From known signing session to signed message: The signature invariant is calculated from the tag of a given session. This signature invariant uniquely identifies the corresponding signature. 2. From known signed message to signing session: Given a signature, we wish to find the corresponding signing session. In the first magic ink proposal [21] , this was done by computing a trace value that was compared to the tag of each potential signing session. In this paper we suggest a more efficient method for this type of tracing. 3. By comparison: The signature invariant of a given signature is compared to the tag of a given session. The output is one bit, whether they correspond to each other or not.
Our Solution
Consider the tracing type 2 above, that is, from a given signature to the corresponding signing session. The idea is to introduce values that are voluntarily submitted by the receiver and that can be used to very efficiently trace from a signature to a signing session. The reason we say that these values, which we call hints, are voluntarily submitted is that due to efficiency requirements, there are no controls on their correctness. It makes little sense for a user to submit an incorrect value, however, since the difference will just be whether the tracing (if needed) will require a low or a medium amount of computational resources. Also, even though an incorrect value will not be detected during the signing (withdrawal) process, it will be detected by the mechanism for illicit signature generation, after which the signature/coin can be traced and revoked, and the user punished. Efficiently, this will make the cost for tracing logarithmic, even though we rely on a fall-back to the linear-time tracing mechanism of the old magic ink solution if the wrong hint value is submitted. A hint can be thought of as an encryption of the signature the receiver obtains, with the property that it is not possible for an adversary corrupting less than a quorum of signer/tracer servers to compute the hint value corresponding to a signature (and vice versa), while a quorum of signer/tracers can efficiently compute the hint value given a signature. The signing process gives the receiver the signature on a message, and gives the signers, among other things, the hint value, which is stored along with other tracing values and the identity of the receiver.
In order to trace from a signature to a signature session, a quorum of tracing servers compute the hint value from the signature, and select the corresponding record (from a list of sessions that has indices sorted with respect to hint values). If no record is found, we use a fall-back to the linear search method described in [23] .
Our signature and hint generation method involves a proof of knowledge by the receiver, to guarantee that the hint value submitted is not a function of hints submitted in previous sessions. (If this were not checked then it would potentially undermine the privacy of other users.) We prove that the addition of the hint value, the process to obtain it, and the other new additions to the scheme do not negatively affect any desired protocol property.
The traditional way to distributively compute and verify the correct form of a value such as the hint value involves sharing of the secret value submitted by the receiver. This is found, however, to drastically increase the costs of the proofs of partial correctness, and we instead take another approach, namely to perform a computation on an encrypted transcript. Although this method is not conceptually novel, it has been used only to a very limited extent, mostly due to the difficulties of computing on encrypted data. We find that the type of computation we need to perform here for the processing of the hint value can be done very efficiently on encrypted data. This method might therefore be of independent interest, and might be applied to similar situations in order to boost the efficiency of other multi-party computations.
Note also that this new method does not affect in any way the resulting signature: the signature obtained by the receiver is still a standard DSS signature (on a message of a particular format.) We believe that this is an important point in order to allow commerial use of the scheme, and to benefit from the careful scrutiny of the DSS that has been performed. The only negative side-effect of our new signature generation scheme, as far as we can see, is the nominal increase in communication and computation of the parties involved, and the small increase in the size of database that is kept by the signer/tracer.
Improved Distributed Magic Ink Signatures
Let us now consider a distributed version of the protocols previously presented. Here, let Q be a quorum of t servers in S 1 . . . S n . We assume that the message m to be signed is of the form m = f M mod p for a generator f. Commonly, this type of scheme is used to sign a public key, in which m is this public key, and M is its corresponding secret key. (For messages M that can be guessed with a non-negligible probability, an alternative form m = f 1 M f 2 R for a random R can be employed.)
System initialization: The servers distributively generate a random secret x for signature generation, using a (t s , n) secret sharing scheme, a random secret x t for tracing, using a (t t , n) secret sharing scheme, and a random secret x h for hint generation, using a (t h , n) secret sharing scheme. Each server S i publishes his shares of the public keys [30] for a discussion of how this is done.) Each server then proves knowledge of his secret shares x i , x ti and x hi to the other servers; if some server fails, then he is replaced and the protocol restarts. Finally, the signing public key y is published.
Session initialization: Before starting the signature generation protocol, the receiver R has to send his identity id and a proof of knowledge of the se-cret key corresponding to id. The signers pick a session identification number, sessionid = id||l, where l is a number making sessionid a unique string.
Signature generation:
1. The servers prepare a temporary key pair:
(a) The set of servers S i |i ∈ Q distributively generate the private session key k ∈ u Z q . (b) Server S i has a share k i and publishes [g ki ] p .
(c) The servers compute r = [g
] p , using the methods for computing reciprocals in [20] . (d) r is sent to the signature receiver R. (d) The set of servers S i |i ∈ Q distributively generate the DSS signature σ on the message µ, using the (shared) public session key ρ; σ is calculated as follows:
] q is interpolated from the σ i 's using the method for multiplication of secrets in [20] . (e) The servers send σ to R. 
Hint-generation:
Let x h be a private key distributively held by the tracing servers; y h = [g xh ] p is the corresponding public key.
The receiver calculates an ElGamal encryption of m:
He chooses a γ ∈ u Z q and calculates (a, b) = (mg γ , y
). This pair is sent to the servers.
(a) The servers distributively compute hint
In order to prove that every server has performed the correct exponentiation the servers run a protocol for proving valid exponentiation, e.g., [12, 32] . This is a proof that log a (hint i b) = log g (y hi ) for a given quadruple (a, g, (hint i b), y hi ). We also have to force the receiver to prove that a is computed the right way. This can be done using the method described below:
Avoiding Subliminal Tracing
Attacks are possible if it is possible for an attacker to inject previously seen encryptions, or functions of these, and observe what hint is produced. The potential problem is if an attacker would use the hint-generation protocol as an oracle to compute a hint of a seen signature. For example, assume an attacker could take a value m of a signature he has seen "on the street", encrypt this (claiming to withdraw a new coin) and send (a, b) = (m g γ , y γ h ) to the servers. Then one dishonest server would watch to see what value hint = m xh is produced: this efficiently traces the value m , because the dishonest participants get to know the corresponding record of the signature. Therefore, the user has to prove that he knows the format of the portion of the encryption that will be raised to the x h power. If he knows a representation, it cannot be a signature "on the street". Our solution for the encryption need to satisfy plaintext awareness (The best description of this concept is probably that of Bellare, Desai, Pointcheval and Rogaway [2] ). This guarantees that the receiver knows the plaintext, preventing this attack. Note, though that this must be done without revealing any transcript-specific information.
We do it by proving knowledge that (a, b) = (f M g γ , y γ h ), without leaking any information about the message m = f M . As mentioned above, we are only concerned about the value a; if b isn't of the right form that only would give us a wrong hint-value.
Since the servers have to verify the computation of a in step 3b of the signature generation protocol, the receiver has to prove knowledge during step 2 and step 3a.
1. Each verifier S i , i ∈ Q (which in our case corresponds to a participating signing server) selects a value i ∈ u Z q .
is sent to the signature receiver.
2. The prover (in our case, the signature receiver) computesâ = [f Mĝγ ] p , where M is the preimage of m and γ is the blinding exponent chosen for the ElGamal encryption. The prover sends a commitment com(â) to the verifiers. Otherwise, he decommits to his commitment ofâ to the verifiers. 5. Each verifier checks thatâ = [a ] p , and accept iff this holds.
Tracing
We recall that we have a secret key x for signing, a secret key x t for tracing, and a secret key x h for generating the hint. [12] , they verify whether log g (y t ) = log tracea trace b , which holds if the signature corresponds to the tag.
By comparison: (unchanged)
Given is a tag = (g µ , y ] p , tag b ). Using the protocol for verification of undeniable signatures, we verify whether log g (y t ) = log tracea trace b , which holds if the signature corresponds to the tag.
Illicit Signature Detection
This section briefly presents our second result in this paper, which is a method to detect that the secret signing key has been compromised. We let the signers periodically blind all the hints for valid sessions, and, using a mix-network, blind portions of the recently "deposited" signatures, and then verify that each blinded deposited transcript corresponds to a blinded session transcript. If there is any blinded deposited transcript that has no match, then this is unblinded and traced. If, during tracing, a matching session is not found, then the servers output "signing key compromised" as this signature cannot have been produced by the signature servers. Otherwise, the signature simply had an incorrect hint value submitted, in which case appropriate action is taken to punish the withdrawer.
We will now present the protocol in more detail:
1. As input the mix servers have a list (hint 1 , . . . , hint K ), which have been generated during signature generation protocols. A blinding exponent ζ is distributively chosen so that ζ = i∈Q ζ i , where ζ i is the share held by server S i . The servers robustly compute (hint . Each corresponding signature is traced using standard methods (see section 6). If the trace is successful, the receiver of the signature is punished for having given the incorect hint value; if there is an unsuccessful trace, then the servers output "signing key corrupted".
Claims
We claim that our scheme achieves anonymity (Theorem 1), revokable anonymity (Theorem 2), unforgeability (Theorem 3) and illicit signature detection (Theorem 4). The theorems are sketched in the appendix. A full version of the proofs, omitted due to space limitations, is available from the authors upon request, and will be part of the second author's Master's thesis.
Appendix
Theorem 1: Let D denote the dishonest signature servers, and H the honest signature servers. An adversary A, who controls any set of less than or equal to t t tracing dishonest servers S j j ∈ D and dishonest receiver R, cannot break the anonymity of the signature scheme, i.e., he is not able to determine whether match(s, τ ) holds for a particular pair (s, τ ) with probability non-negligibly better than a guess.
Outline of Proof of Theorem 1: Employing an oracle for generating valid DSS signatures, we provide a simulator S for all the protocols. Each simulation generates transcripts that cannot be distinguished from the real protocol transcripts by an adversary A as above. We then compose the individual simulations to form a simulator for the entire protocol. We show that the adversary A cannot distinguish the transcripts generated during the simulation from the transcripts generated by a real protocol. ¿From this we can conclude that the adversary cannot break the anonymity of the scheme. This must hold since the adversary can produce the same transcripts himself by the use of the simulator and the simulator does not have access to the secret key for tracing. 2 Theorem 2: The system achieves revokable anonymity, i.e., any quorum of honest tracing servers is able to perform the following actions: (a) Given a valid message-signature pair described by s i and the list of all signer-side transcripts (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ), select the value τ j , such that match(s i , τ j ). (b) Given a valid message-signature pair described by s i and one signer-side transcript τ j , determine whether match(s i , τ j ) holds. (c) Given a signer-side transcript τ i , compute a value trace i such that given trace i and a value s j , a third party can determine in polynomial time, and without any interaction, whether match(s j , τ i ) holds.
We refer to [23] for the proof.
Theorem 3: The system achieves unforgeability, i.e., an adversary A, who controls any set of less than or equal to t t tracing dishonest servers S j j ∈ D and dishonest receiver R , cannot generate a signature that gets accepted as valid.
Outline of Proof of Theorem 3: Assume the contrary. Then it must be possible to construct a valid signature given only the shares of the secret signature generation key x held by the t t dishonest servers. Since the secret key has been shared with a (t, n) threshold scheme, it is not possible to reconstruct the secret key with less the t + 1 shares. Therefore A only has shares that are statistically uncorrelated to the secret key, this would by a simulation argumentation imply that valid signatures could be generated without any secret knowledge. 2
Theorem 4:
The system is detecting illicit signatures, i.e., the signer/tracer is able to check whether there exist a signer-side transcript τ such that match(s, τ ) holds.
Outline of Proof of Theorem 4: There are exactly three types of valid signatures: (1) those with correct hint values, (2) those with incorrect hint values, and (3) those with no hint values. For each signature the signature servers generate, a valid or invalid hint is produced (which one depends on whether the receiver is honest or not) and stored in the signer database, to which all writes are detected by the signers, and therefore, to which only the signers can write. When a signature is generated by the adversary, no hint is therefore stored in this database. Each signature (m, r, s) with a valid hint can be matched to its singature session by computing hint = m xh , which can always be done by a quorum of servers. This value identifies the signing session. Each signature with an invalid hint can be matched to its signing session by finding a pair (tag a , tag b ) in the signer database, such that tag a rm −1 = tag b . This pair, which again identifies the session, is robustly computed during the signing session, and so, must exist in the database for valid signing sessions. An illicit signature has no session record stored. It is not possible to produce a valid signature (m, r, s) on a known preimage M such that this record matches a recorded hint value or tag value. The former holds since the hint value determines the message m, and therfore also M; the latter holds since a given triple (m, tag a , tag b ) determines the value r, which would pre-
